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11 Introduction
Deliberation over collective decisions often takes the form of debates. What
distinguishes debates from other collective-choice procedures is the element
of rhetoric. Like voting mechanisms, debates aggregate “raw data” such as
individual motives or diﬀerential information. However, unlike voting, the
resolution of debates depends not only on the raw data elicited from debaters,
but also on quality of the arguments in which the data are couched. “Irrele-
vant” information can appear convincing in the hands of a skilled rhetorician,
whereas high-quality information can turn ineﬀective in the hands of an inept
one.
Elements of rhetoric play an important role in various decision processes,
such as litigation, parliamentary legislation and public-opinion formation.
Nevertheless, except for two very recent works, Glazer and Rubinstein (2000)
and Aragones et. al. (2001), I know of no attempt by economic theorists
to formalize aspects of rhetoric and argumentation. For a survey of these
papers, as well as other works in the intersection of economics and language,
see Lipman (2002). (In the large literature on strategic information trans-
mission, communication games are sometimes described as “debates”, but
this literature is not concerned with rhetorical aspects of communication.)
What makes debates especially hard to model is their relative lack of
explicit structure, comparing with mechanisms such as voting or even bar-
gaining. The “laws of rhetoric”, which determine the legitimacy and strength
of arguments are seldom clear-cut. This suggests that an axiomatic approach,
which does not commit to a particular game-theoretic structure, might be
useful at this stage of the research program.
This paper is a ﬁr s ts t e pi na na t t e m p tt od e v e l o pa na x i o m a t i cm o d e l i n g
approach to debates, somewhat in the spirit of social choice theory. Here
are some of the questions that I aim to analyze using this approach: What
determines the strength of arguments? Can certain decision biases originate
from rhetorical eﬀects? How does the procedure of debates aﬀect rhetorical
conventions?
Needless to say, I do not pretend to oﬀer a “general model of debates”.
Rather, I will adopt the axiomatic approach to study a particular aspect
of rhetoric that arise in the context of debates over multiple issues.P e o p l e
usually hold conﬂicting opinions over more than one issue. When they enter
a debate they may discuss one or more of these issues. Moreover, the decision
whether to introduce a new issue into the discussion is deliberate, as it may
2aﬀect the debate’s outcome. My task in this paper will be to analyze the
implications of this consideration on the outcome of multi-issue debates.
I will view multi-issue debates as two-stage procedures for selecting a win-
ning party on the basis of raw data. An argumentation rule transforms raw
data into sets of available arguments for each party, depending on the issue
or set of issues under discussion. In other words, it captures the rhetorical
convention that determines which pieces of information count as admissible
arguments in a particular debate. A persuasion rule is a function that selects
a winning party, given the parties’ admissible arguments. In other words, it
captures the rhetorical convention that determines the strength of diﬀerent
arguments.
To motivate our discussion, imagine a political debate between a “right-
wing” party and a “left-wing” party, who disagree over a pair of issues:
death penalty and abortion rights. There are four possible “worldviews”
(combinations of yes/no opinions on these issues). Two of these worldviews
are held by the debating parties. The right-wing (left-wing) party approves
(disapproves) of the death penalty and disapproves (approves) of abortion
rights. “Raw data” consists of desirable attributes that each of the four
possible worldviews may or may not possess. “Crime reduction”, “sanctity
of human life”, or “consistency with constitutional law” are examples of such
attributes.
As mentioned above, the debaters can discuss these two issues indepen-
dently or conjointly. To make this distinction concrete, imagine a conference
devoted to the public debate between the right-wing and left-wing parties
over death penalty and abortion rights. The conference can be conducted in
two ways:
1. “Parallel sessions”: Diﬀerent issues are discussed separately inside dif-
ferent halls in front of diﬀerent audiences.
2. “Plenary session”: both issues are discussed inside one large hall in
front of all conference attendants.
The conference thus generates three possible debates from the same raw
data: one debate exclusively devoted to death penalty, one debate exclusively
devoted to abortion rights, and one debate over both subjects in conjunction.
The raw data underlying each of these debates is the same. Nevertheless,
3it may endow the parties with diﬀerent sets of available arguments in the
diﬀerent sessions.
For example, the “sanctity of human life” argument may be available
only to the left-wing (right-wing) party in the death-penalty (abortion-rights)
parallel session. Thus, when people disagree over multiple issues, the notion
of a supporting argument is not obvious because the same raw data can
provide a particular supporting argument for either party, depending on the
“session” - i.e., the issue or combination of issues in question.
This is where the dichotomy between argumentation rules and persuasion
r u l e st u r n so u tt ob eu s e f u l . T h ea r g u m e n t a t i o nr u l ed e t e r m i n e st h es e to f
arguments that are available to each party in each of the three sessions.
The persuasion rule then selects a winning party for each session on the
basis of the arguments that are available to each party in that session. The
core assumption in the model will be a consistency condition that links the
resolution of the parallel sessions to the resolution of the plenary session.
Formally, the model can be outlined as follows. To keep things simple, I
assume that there are only two relevant issues. Every issue admits a yes/no
opinion. Two parties hold opposite views on both issues. There is a universal
set M of desirable attributes. A state (i.e., the “raw data”) is a function that
assigns a subset of M to each of the four possible combinations of yes/no
opinions on the two issues. A debate is a pair of subsets of M,o n ef o re a c h
party. An argumentation rule D is a function that assigns a triple of debates
(one parallel session per issue, as well as one plenary session) to every state.
A persuasion rule r is a function that assigns a winning party to every debate.
The pair (D,r) is called a multi-issue debate model (MDM).
This formalism contains an implicit assumption: the persuasion rule is
invariant to the issue or combination of issues in dispute. In other words,
the rhetorical convention that determines the strength of arguments is the
same for all sessions. All the diﬀerences among sessions are captured by the
argumentation rule.
In addition, the MDM is required to satisfy two axioms: (1) “Procedural
Invariance” - for every state, if the same party wins both parallel sessions,
he must win the plenary session as well; (2) “Free Disposal” - a debater can-
not be harmed by having more available arguments. Procedural Invariance
is the key axiom in the model. It captures a sort of “procedural equilib-
rium” in the way people conduct multi-issue debates. It means that parties
are able to discuss a particular issue, say the death penalty, such that no
party would have a strong incentive to bring the other issue (abortion rights)
4into the discussion and turn it into a grand debate about the parties’ entire
worldviews.
T h em a i ne x e r c i s et h a tIc a r r yo u ti st oc haracterize the persuasion rules
that satisfy these axioms for two alternative speciﬁcations of the argumenta-
tion rule D:
“Positive argumentation” .A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sa r g umentation rule, par-
ties argue by listing desirable attributes of worldviews that are consistent
with their position in a debate. Under this rule, only a constant persuasion
rule satisﬁes the two axioms - i.e., the same party must win all debates.
“Negative argumentation” . A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sa r g u m e n t a t i o nr u l e ,
parties argue by listing desirable attributes of worldviews that are inconsis-
tent with the opponent’s position in the debate. Under this rule, the two
axioms allow for non-constant persuasion rules, but these involve the follow-
ing bias. There exists a party k and a subset of attributes M∗,s u c ht h a t
party k wins any debate whenever his argument set intersects M∗.M o r e o v e r ,
M∗ is uniquely characterized as the smallest subset, whose exclusion from
k’s argument set guarantees the victory of k’s opponent whenever the latter’s
argument set is M.
These results demonstrate how diﬀerent kinds of argumentation can lead
to diﬀerent resolutions of debates, given the same raw data. As we shall
see, the characterization results, and the reasoning behind them, highlight
rhetorical eﬀects that we sometimes encounter in real-life multi-issue debates.
I should emphasize that I do not view the model as a predictive theory of how
real-life debates are resolved. Rather, the axiomatic method enables me to
highlight some rhetorical considerations that we observe in real-life debates.
The general idea of breaking up rhetorical conventions into a rule that
determines the admissibility of arguments and a rule that determines their
persuasiveness has a precedent in Glazer and Rubinstein (2001). However,
the methodology of Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) is game-theoretic, whereas
I adopt an axiomatic approach. The particular problems addressed in the
two papers are also very diﬀerent. The fact that such diﬀerent formal out-
looks rely on this general idea suggests its fruitfulness for thinking about the
subject of rhetoric and argumentation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the MDM. Section 3
presents the characterization results. In Section 4, I analyze an extended
MDM, in which debaters can use more than just one type of argument. I
5show that when parties can use both positive and negative argumentation,
the resolution of debates is solely determined by the negative arguments. This
result demonstrates the extended model’s potential for analyzing the problem
of what makes certain types of argument more eﬀective rhetorically than
others. Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks and discusses related literature.
2 A Model of Multi-Issue Debates
I begin with a bit of terminology. Let α and β be a pair of issues.T h e r e
are four possible yes/no opinions on these issues: (yes to α,y e st oβ), (no to
α,n ot oβ), (yes to α,n ot oβ)a n d( n ot oα,y e st oβ). I refer to each of
these four multi-issue opinions as a worldview.T w op a r t i e s ,1 and 2 (party
j’s rival is referred to as party −j) hold opposite opinions on both issues.
E.g., party 1’ sw o r l d v i e wi s( y e st oα,n ot oβ)a n dp a r t y2’s worldview is
(no to α,y e st oβ). The worldview that agrees with party j on issue α and
with party k on issue β is denoted jk.
Let M beaﬁnite set of desirable attributes.Adebate d =( A1,A 2) is a pair
of attribute subsets, where Ak ⊆ M is party k’s argument set in the debate.
Since the model is not game-theoretic, there is no explicit distinction between
the arguments that are available to the parties and the arguments that they
actually raise in the course of the debate. However, I will consistently use
the former interpretation.
A state is a function ω : {1,2}2 → 2M that assigns a subset of attributes
to every worldview. For every j,k ∈ {1,2}, ωjk is the set of attributes
assigned to the worldview that agrees with party j over issue α and with
party k over issue β.( T h ef u n c t i o nω need not be partitional: an attribute
can be assigned to no worldview, or to several worldviews at the same time.)
T h es e to fa l ls t a t e si sd e n o t e dΩ.
So far, our terminology contains two levels: debates (i.e., the arguments
available to parties) and states (i.e., the raw data underlying the debates),
but these two levels are not linked together in any way. The model we are
about to construct will provide the link between raw data and the arguments
that parties can raise in debates on the basis of the raw data.
A m u l t i - i s s u ed e b a t em o d e l(MDM) is a pair (D,r),w h e r eD and r are
referred to as the argumentation rule and persuasion rule, respectively:
6The argumentation rule is a function D : Ω → (2M)2×(2M)2×(2M)2,
which assigns a triple of debates D(ω)=( dα(ω),d β(ω),d α◦β(ω)) to every
state ω ∈ Ω.W h yatriple of debates? When two parties disagree over a pair
of issues, they may discuss them independently or conjointly. Thus, every
state generates three possible debates: a “parallel session” dα(ω) devoted to
issue α, a “parallel session” dβ(ω) devoted to issue β, and a “plenary session”
dα◦β(ω) on both issues in conjunction. In the parallel session devoted to issue
a ∈ {α,β}, the parties argue their opinions on a. In the plenary session, they
argue their entire worldviews.
The Persuasion rule is a function r :( 2 M)2 → {1,2}, which assigns a
winning party r(d) ∈ {1,2} to every debate d =( A1,A 2).N o t et h a tr need
not be symmetric - i.e., it is not required that r(A,B)=−r(B,A) whenever
A 6= B. An asymmetric persuasion rule may be sensitive to the parties’
names, in addition to their argument sets. The role of this extra degree of
freedom will become clear in the sequel.
The argumentation rule captures the rhetorical convention that deter-
mines which arguments are admissible for every party in every debate, given
the raw data. The persuasion rule captures the rhetorical convention that
determines the relative strength of the parties’ admissible arguments. In
other words, an MDM is a two-stage procedure. The ﬁrst stage carries us
from raw data to arguments, and the second stage carries us from arguments
to the outcome of the debate.
An important feature of this model is that the two stages are indepen-
dent. The persuasion rule is the same for every debate, whether the debate
is a plenary session or a parallel session on any particular issue. All dif-
ferences between sessions are reﬂe c t e di nt h ea r g u m e n t a t i o nr u l e :d i ﬀerent
sessions can admit diﬀerent argument sets, given the same underlying state.
Of course, this is a strong assumption - in real-life debates, the strength of a
particular argument sometimes seems to depend on the debated issue.
Note that the outcome of debates in this model is deﬁned as the identity
of the winning party. Thus, this is an adversarial model of debates, which ﬁts
televised debates between political candidates, or debating clubs. In many
real-life debates, however, the important thing about the outcome is not who
wins the debate, but what position wins. In other situations, debaters do
n o tc a r ea b o u tw i n n i n ga ta l l ,a n dt h e yu s et h ed e b a t ef o r m a tt oa c h i e v e
a better understanding of the underlying issues. Finally, the objective of
7debating parties is often changing the opponent’s convictions, rather than
just winning. This aspect of real-life debates is not captured at all by the
present model.
To illustrate the concept of an argumentation rule, let us return to the
“political debate” example of the introduction. Let α and β stand for “death
penalty” and “abortion rights”. Party 1 (right-wing) approves of the former
and disapproves of the latter. Party 2 (left-wing) holds opposite opinions on
both issues. Suppose that in the state ω, the attribute “sanctity of human
life”, denoted ¯ m, is assigned only to the worldview that agrees with the left-
wing party on the death penalty and with the right-wing party on abortion
rights. That is, ¯ m ∈ ω21 and ¯ m/ ∈ ω11,ω12,ω22.
In this case, it is not obvious a priori that the left-wing party can use
“sanctity of human life” as an argument in the parallel session on the death
penalty. Can people, when discussing the death penalty, list attributes that
are somehow consonant with their opinion on the death penalty, but not
with their entire worldview (which also consists of their opinion on abortion
rights)? That depends on the rhetorical convention for what counts as an
admissible argument in the debate. This is where the argumentation rule D
comes into play: it determines whether ¯ m belongs to party 2’s argument set
in the parallel session dα(ω).
I shall discuss further the concept of an argumentation rule at the begin-
ning of Section 3.
The possibility of two diﬀerent procedures for conducting multi-issue de-
bates - “parallel sessions” vs. “plenary session” - naturally raises the question
of how the debates’ procedure aﬀects their outcome.
Let us impose two axioms on the MDM (D,r).T h eﬁrst axiom requires
the MDM to satisfy a “free disposal” property:
Axiom 1 (Free Disposal) If r(A1,A 2)=k, Ak ⊆ Bk and B−k ⊆ A−k,
then r(B1,B 2)=k.
Free Disposal (FD henceforth) means that if a certain party wins a de-
bate, then expanding his argument set or shrinking his opponent’s cannot
reverse the outcome. This axiom is particularly attractive if we insist on
interpreting Ak as the set of arguments that are available to party k in the
8debate d =( A1,A 2), rather than as the set of arguments that he actually
raises during the debate. Under the former interpretation, FD means that
parties never raise arguments that would make them lose the debate. (Of
course, since the MDM is not a game-theoretic model, the distinction between
available and actually used arguments is quite artiﬁcial.)
The second axiom I shall impose on the MDM (D,r) requires a certain
form of “Procedural Invariance”:
Axiom 2 (Procedural Invariance) For every ω ∈ Ω,i fr[dα(ω)] = r[dβ(ω)] =
k,t h e nr[dα◦β(ω)] = k.
Procedural Invariance (PI henceforth) is a consistency requirement, some-
what in the spirit of “single-proﬁle conditions” in social choice theory. It
means that given a state of the world, if the same party wins both “parallel
sessions”, he would win the “plenary session” as well.
PI is a stability property of the rhetorical conventions captured by (D,r).
If PI were violated, then there would exist a state, in which one party prefers
to discuss the issues separately, while his opponent prefers to discuss them
conjointly. The parties would thus ﬁght over procedure instead of substance
and in this sense, the rhetorical conventions would cease to be stable. I
will be interested in multi-issue debates models that do not suﬀer from this
instability.
PI captures a sort of “procedural equilibrium” in multi-issue debates.
People normally disagree over many issues. What allows them to discuss a
speciﬁc issue independently is some norm, according to which the debaters’
views on other issues are irrelevant to the current debate. In order for this
norm to be stable, no party should have a strong incentive to introduce other
issues into the discussion and turn it into a grand debate over the parties’
entire worldviews.
T h er o l eo fm u l t i p l ei s s u e s
The MDM can be viewed as an extension of a more standard attribute-
based model, in which the two parties disagree over a single yes/no issue; a
s t a t ei saf u n c t i o nω that assigns subsets of M to each every opinion on the
issue, where ωj is the set of attributes of party j’s opinion; a debate continues
9to be a pair of attribute sets (A1,A 2), but now Aj = ωj, such that a debate
a n das t a t ea r et h es a m et h i n g .
In such a model, the “persuasion rule” r is a function that acts directly
on the “raw data” ω and assigns a winning party r(ω) ∈ {1,2} to every state
ω. Since there is no distinction between raw data and arguments, there is no
n e e df o ra n“ a r g u m e n t a t i o nr u l e ” .N o t et h a ti fw ei m p o s es y m m e t r yo nt h i s
model (i.e., r(A,B)=r(B,A) whenever A 6= B), it is reduced to a complete
binary relation on 2M.
As we saw earlier, the distinction between raw data and arguments be-
comes necessary when we turn from single-issue to multi-issue debates, be-
cause the notion of a supporting argument is not clear-cut anymore: dif-
ferent “sessions” are characterized by diﬀerent sets of arguments, given the
same raw data. Adding the argumentation-rule component to the standard
attribute-based model allows us to deal with this complication created by
the multiplicity of issues.
The general idea of viewing debates as two-stage procedures, consisting
of an argumentation rule and a persuasion rule is not peculiar to multi-
issue debates. One could surely construct interesting models of single-issue
debates on the basis of the same idea. Multi-issue debates simply provide an
environment, in which the need for a two-stage procedure arises naturally.
In principle, the MDM can easily be generalized for any number I>2 of
issues in disagreement between the two parties. In such an extended model,
however, there are several ways to generalize the Procedural Invariance ax-
iom. For example, we may insist on “plenary session” and “parallel sessions”
as the only relevant procedures. In this case, each state generates I +1
diﬀerent sessions. (I parallel sessions on each issue independently, and one
plenary session on all issues simultaneously.) Alternatively, we may wish to
consider debates over any combination of issues. In this case, each state gen-
erates 2I − 1 diﬀerent sessions. Such generalizations are left to be pursued
by future research.
3A n a l y s i s
This section characterizes persuasion rules that satisfy the Free Disposal
and Procedural Invariance axioms, for two alternative speciﬁcations of the
argumentation rule D.





α (ω)=( ω11 ∪ ω12,ω21 ∪ ω22)
3. d
pos
β (ω)=( ω11 ∪ ω21,ω12 ∪ ω22)
I will refer to Dpos as the “positive argumentation” rule. It captures the
following rhetorical convention: an attribute serves as an argument support-
ing a party’s position in a “session” if it is assigned at least to one worldview,
which is consistent with this position. In other words, parties argue by saying
what is good about the worldviews that are consistent with their position in
the debate.
In the “plenary session”, party k’s argument set is simply ωkk, the set of
attributes assigned to his worldview. In the “parallel session devoted to issue
α”, party k’s argument set is the union of ωkk and ωkj, as both attribute sets
are assigned to worldviews that agree with party k on the issue α. Similarly,
in the “parallel session devoted to issue β”, party k’s argument set is the
union of ωkk and ωjk, as both attribute sets are assigned to worldviews that
agree with party k on the issue β.
Now consider the following alternative argumentation rule Dneg:
1. d
neg









Iw i l lr e f e rt oDneg as the “negative argumentation” rule. It captures
ad i ﬀerent rhetorical convention than Dpos: parties do not argue by saying
what is desirable about their own position in the debate, but rather what is
desirable about the negation of the opponent’s position. In other words, an
attribute serves as a negative argument supporting party k’s position in a
session if it is assigned to a worldview that is inconsistent with party −k’s
position in that session.
In the parallel sessions, Dpos and Dneg coincide because the parties ar-
gue about a single yes/no issue, wherein party k’s position is precisely the
11negation of party −k’s position. In the plenary session, Dpos and Dneg diﬀer
because party k’s worldview is not the negation of party −k’s worldview.
To illustrate these argumentation rules, let M = {m,n,p} and construct
the state ω as follows: ω11 = ω12 = {m}, ω21 = {m,p}, ω22 = {n}.I tm a y
be useful to present the state in the form of a matrix (ωjk):
{m}{ m}
{m,p}{ n} (Table 1)
Then, dpos
α (ω)=dneg







α◦β(ω)=( {m},{n}) and d
neg
α◦β(ω)=( {m,p},M).
We see that the same raw data gives rise to diﬀerent argument sets under
diﬀerent argumentation rules. Each argumentation rule captures a diﬀerent
kind of rhetorical manipulation of raw data. Under Dpos, each party argues
by saying what is good about the worldviews that are consistent with his
position in the debate. Under Dneg, each party argues by saying what is good
about the worldviews that are inconsistent with the opponent’s position in
the debate.
3.1 Characterizing r under “Positive Argumentation”
Let us ﬁrst explore the implications of FD and PI on the persuasion rule,
when the argumentation rule is D = Dpos.
Proposition 1 If (Dpos,r) satisﬁes PI and FD, then r must be constant -
i.e., there exists k ∈ {1,2}, such that r(A,B)=k for every A,B ⊆ M.
Proof. For notational ease, denote Dpos = D.L e tr(A,B)=1 , w.l.o.g.
Consider the following state ω: ω22 = B and ω11 = ω12 = ω21 = A.
Then, dα◦β(ω)=( A,B) and dα(ω)=dβ(ω)=( A,A ∪ B), hence r[dα(ω)] =
r[dβ(ω)] ≡ k.B yP I ,k =1 .T h u s ,r(A,A∪B)=1 .B yF D ,r(A∪B,A)=1 .
Now construct the state ψ as follows: ψ11 = B and ψ22 = ψ12 = ψ21 = A.
Then, dα◦β(ψ)=( B,A) and dα(ψ)=dβ(ψ)=( A ∪ B,A).S i n c er[dα(ψ)] =
r[dβ(ψ)] = 1,P Ii m p l i e sr[dα◦β(ψ)] = 1.W eh a v et h u ss h o w nt h a tr(A,B)=
12r(B,A) for every A,B ⊆ M.I np a r t i c u l a r ,r(∅,M)=r(M,∅)=1 .B yF D ,
r(A,B)=1for all A,B ⊆ M.
This is an impossibility result: under Dpos, PI and FD rule out a non-
trivial persuasion rule. The intuition behind this result is simple. Positive Ar-
gumentation means that even when an argument does not support a party’s
e n t i r ew o r l d v i e w ,i tc a ns u p p o r th i sp o s i t i o ni ne a c ho ft h ep a r a l l e ls e s s i o n s .
This is what happens in the state ω given by Table 1: the attribute m is ex-
cluded from party 2’s argument set in the plenary session (m/ ∈ ω22) ,b u ti ti s
included in his argument set in each of the parallel sessions. (m ∈ ω22 ∪ ω12
and m ∈ ω22 ∪ ω21.)
Suppose that r is not constant. Then, there is a state ω and a party k,
such that k loses the plenary session yet wins each of the parallel sessions,
thanks to an argument that supports his opinion on any issue in isolation,
while failing to support his entire worldview. Therefore, Procedural Invari-
ance is violated: party k strictly prefers to discuss issues in isolation, whereas
party −k prefers to discuss them simultaneously.
For instance, let M = {m,n} and suppose that the persuasion rule sat-
isﬁes r({m},{n})=1and r({m},{m,n})=2 . That is, adding m to
party 2’s argument set overturns the outcome in his favor. When ω11 =
ω12 = ω21 = {m} and ω22 = {n}, dpos
α (ω)=d
pos
β (ω)=( {m},{m,n}) and
d
pos
α◦β(ω)=( {m},{n}), hence party 2 loses the plenary session yet wins each
of the parallel sessions, in contradiction to PI.
The rhetorical eﬀect involved here can be likened to promising the same
dollar to two diﬀerent people:t h i st r i c kw o r k sa sl o n ga st h et w op e o p l ea r e
kept apart, but not when they are both present in the same room. Similarly,
in the parallel sessions, parties can raise positive arguments, which would be
inadmissible in the plenary sessions because they do not support their entire
worldviews. The availability of this rhetorical trick leads to the violation of
Procedural Invariance.
3.2 Characterizing r under “Negative Argumentation”
The rhetorical trick that destabilizes non-trivial persuasion rules when the
argumentation rule is Dpos stems from the discrepancy between what is ar-
guable in parallel sessions and what is arguable in plenary sessions. Specif-
ically, ω12 and ω21 (the attributes of the “mixed” worldviews that are held
by none of the parties) enter into the parties’ positive argument sets only in
13the parallel sessions. This discrepancy is attenuated under Dneg because ω12
and ω21 enter into the parties’ argument sets in the plenary session, too.
For illustration, let M = {m,n} and construct the state ω as follows:
ω11 = ω12 = ω21 = {m} and ω22 = {n}. Let us depict ω in matrix form:
{m}{ m}












α◦β(ω)=( {m},M).E a c hp a r t yh a sd i ﬀerent sets of positive
arguments in the parallel and the plenary sessions, whereas each party has
the same set of negative arguments in each session. Therefore, under the
negative argumentation rule, parties do not have any procedural preference
in this state because their arsenal of arguments is the same for each of the
two procedures for running the multi-issue debate.
This example suggests that the forces that destabilize rhetorical conven-
tions are weaker under negative argumentation than under positive argu-
mentation. Consequently, our characterization of persuasion rules should be
more permissive. This indeed turns out to be the case:
Proposition 2 If (Dneg,r) satisﬁes PI and FD, and r is not a constant
function, then there exists a unique party k (say, k =1 , w.l.o.g) and a
unique non-empty subset M∗ ⊂ M,s u c ht h a t :
1. r(A1,A 2)=1whenever M∗ ∩ A1 6= φ.
2. r(A1,A 2)=2whenever M∗ ∩ A1 = φ and A2 = M.
This result characterizes a class of biased persuasion rules. There exists
a subset M∗ ⊆ M, such that one party (say, party 1) wins any debate, as
long as his argument set contains some attribute m ∈ M∗.T h i ss u b s e tM∗
is uniquely identiﬁed as the smallest set B, whose empty intersection with
A1 implies r(A1,M)=2 .N o t et h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et h a tr(A,B)=1for some
B ⊆ M,e v e nw h e nM∗ ∩ A = ∅. That is, empty intersection between party
1’s argument set and M∗ is a necessary, but insuﬃcient condition for party
2’s victory.
14Proof. We will say that a non-empty subset C ⊆ M is decisive in favor
of party k if r(A1,A 2)=k whenever Ak = M and C∩A−k = φ.I fC contains
no proper non-empty subset, which is also decisive in favor of k, we will say
that C is minimally decisive in favor of k.
If r(φ,M)=1 ,t h e nb yF D ,r(A,B)=1for every A,B ⊆ M - i.e., r is
constant, a contradiction. Therefore, r(φ,M)=2 ,w h i c hm e a n st h a tM is
decisive in favor of party 2. Thus, there exists a non-empty subset M∗ ⊆
M, which is minimally decisive in favor of party 2.T h a t i s , r(A,M)=2
whenever M∗ ∩ A = φ;a n df o re v e r yB ⊂ M∗,t h e r ee x i s t sA ⊆ M,s u c h
that B ∩ A = φ, (M∗ − B) ∩ A 6= φ and r(A,M)=1 .
We have thus established the existence of a set M∗, which meets condition
(2) in the statement of the proposition. Our next objective will be to establish
that r(A,M)=1whenever M∗ ∩ A 6= φ.
For notational ease, denote Dneg = D. Suppose that r(A,M)=2for
some A ⊆ M,f o rw h i c hM∗ ∩ A ≡ R 6= φ.B yF D ,r(R,M)=2 .C o n s i d e r
the state ω as follows: ω11 = φ, ω12 = M − M∗, ω21 = R and ω22 = M.I t
will be useful to present ω in matrix form:
φM − M∗
RM (Table 3)
By the deﬁnition of D, dα(ω)=( M − M∗,M), dβ(ω)=( R,M) and
dα◦β(ω)=( ( M − M∗) ∪ R,M).S i n c e M∗ is decisive in favor of party 2,
r[dα(ω)] = 2. We already saw that r[dβ(ω)] = 2 as well. By PI, r[dα◦β(ω)] =
2.B y F D , r(B,M)=2for every B ⊆ (M − M∗) ∪ R - i.e., by every B
satisfying (M∗−R)∩B = φ.T h e r e f o r e ,M∗−R is decisive in favor of party
2, thus contradicting the fact that M∗ is minimally decisive in favor of party
2.
It follows that whenever M∗∩A 6= φ, r(A,M)=1and by FD, r(A,B)=1
for every B ⊆ M. We have thus shown that there exists a set M∗,w h i c h
meets conditions (1) and (2) in the statement of the proposition. Two things
remain to be shown: (i) there is no other minimally decisive set in favor of
party 2, in addition to M∗; (ii) there is no decisive set in favor of party 1.
(i) Suppose that there are two diﬀerent minimally decisive sets in favor
of party 2, M∗
1 and M∗




2 is decisive in favor of party 2.W e h a v e
15found a non-empty set A = M∗
1 − M∗
2,s u c ht h a tr(A,M)=2 ,a l t h o u g h
M∗
1 is decisive in favor of party 2 and A ∩ M∗
1 6= φ (by deﬁnition of A), a
contradiction with what we have already proved.
(ii) Suppose that M∗
1 and M∗
2 are decisive in favor of parties 1 and 2,
respectively. Consider the debate ({a},{b}),w h e r ea ∈ M∗
2 and b ∈ M∗
1.
By the above result, a ∈ M∗
2 implies r(a,b)=1 ,w h e r e a sb ∈ M∗
1 implies
r(a,b)=2 , a contradiction.
Proposition 2 implies that the resolution of plenary sessions is sensitive
to the attributes of the “mixed” worldviews that are held by none of the
parties. A change in ω12 or ω21 can reverse the outcome of the plenary
session d
neg
α◦β(ω). To see why, suppose that r[d
neg
α◦β(ω)] = 2, given some state
ω. Then, M∗ ∩ (ω11 ∪ ω12 ∪ ω21)=φ.N o w ,l e tψ be identical to ω,e x c e p t
that ψ12 = ω12 ∪ {m},w h e r em ∈ M∗. Nothing in the attributes of the
parties’ own worldviews has changed. However, according to Proposition 2,
r[d
neg
α◦β]=1 . Thus, there is a sense in which the resolution of plenary sessions
depends on “irrelevant alternatives”.
Interpreting Proposition 2
The bias identiﬁed by Proposition 2 recalls an interesting phenomenon
that is sometimes encountered in real-life debates over proposals to depart
from a status quo.
Imagine two parties, a “status-quo upholder” and a “reformer”, who dis-
cuss in front of some audience the latter’s proposal to reform university ad-
mission policy. The reformer’s proposal abolishes the SAT and introduces
aﬃrmative action. This is a “closed-rule” debate: either the proposal is ac-
cepted in toto, or the status quo prevails. There is no room for compromise.
The following exchange of arguments takes place. The reformer argues by
listing desirable attributes of the proposed reform. The status-quo upholder
counter-argues that a milder reform (which retains the SAT and only intro-
duces aﬃrmative action) would share some of these attributes. The audience
judges that the debate has been won by status quo upholder.
What is going on here? Given the rules of the debate, the status-quo
upholder’s utterance cannot be construed as a suggested compromise, but
rather as a rebuttal of the reformer’s arguments. The meaning of his counter-
argument is that the attributes mentioned by the reformer provide insuﬃcient
reason for abandoning the status quo in favor of his proposal for a drastic
16reform, because they could also support a milder reform. The audience’s
judgment means that it was a smashing counter-argument.
Let us try to interpret this eﬀect in terms of the MDM. The two parties
conduct a debate over two issues, SAT and aﬃrmative action, under a “ple-
nary session” procedure. The argumentation rule is Dneg.T h e r e f o r m e r ’ s
worldview (against SAT, in favor of aﬃrmative action) has several desirable
attributes, but another worldview (“the milder reform”) shares some of these
attributes. Therefore, the status quo upholder’s set of negative arguments
contains some of the attributes that are assigned to the reformer’s worldview.
Some of these attributes belong to the subset M∗. Therefore, the status quo
upholder wins the plenary session, even though his own worldview (in favor of
SAT, against aﬃrmative action) may fail to possess any desirable attribute.
Non-Emptiness
To see that the class of persuasion rules identiﬁed by Proposition 2 is not
vacuous, construct the following persuasion rule: r(A,B)=2if and only if
M∗ ⊆ B − A,w h e r eM∗ is a proper non-empty subset of M.T h u s ,party 2
wins a debate if and only if M∗ is exclusively contained in his argument set.
In the plenary session, this means that each of the attributes in M∗ must be
assigned to party 2’s worldview, and to none of the other three worldviews.
It is easy to verify that (Dneg,r) satisﬁes FD. Let us check that (Dneg,r)
also satisﬁes PI. Suppose that given ω,p a r t y1 wins both parallel sessions.
In particular, he wins the session devoted to issue α. Then, by the deﬁnition
of r, M∗ ∩ (ω11 ∪ ω12) 6= φ or M∗ Ã ω22 ∪ ω21. Either possibility implies
that party 1 wins the plenary session as well. Alternatively, suppose that
given ω, party 2 wins both parallel sessions. Then, by the deﬁnition of r,
M∗ ⊆ (ω22∪ω21)−(ω11∪ω12) and M∗ ⊆ (ω22∪ω12)−(ω11∪ω21). It follows
that M∗ ⊆ ω22 and M∗ ∩ (ω11 ∪ ω12 ∪ ω21)=φ, hence party 2 wins the
plenary session as well.
Illustrating the proof
Let us use an example with a three-element attribute set M,i no r d e r
to illustrate how the proof of Proposition 2 works. Let M = {m,n,p} and
suppose that the subset {m,n} is minimally decisive in favor of party 2 - i.e.,
r(A,M)=2whenever B ∩ A = φ, and there exists no proper non-empty
17subset of B with the same property. Suppose, contrary to Proposition 2,
that r({n},M)=2 . Construct the state ψ as follows: ψ11 = φ, ψ12 = {p},
ψ21 = {n} and ψ22 = M. Once again, it is helpful to present the state in the
form of a matrix:
φ {p}
{n}{ m,n,p} (Table 4)
Then, dneg
α (ψ)=( {p},M), d
neg
β (ψ)=( {n},M) and d
neg
α◦β(ψ)=( {n,p},M).
Since r(A,M)=2whenever {m,n}∩A = φ, r[dneg
α (ψ)] = 2. By assumption,
r[d
neg
β (ψ)] = 2.B yP I ,r[d
neg
α◦β(ψ)] = 2.B yF D ,r(A,M)=2whenever m/ ∈ A,
in contradiction to the deﬁnition of M∗ as a minimally decisive set in favor
of party 2.
3.3 Summary of the Characterization Results
Let us summarize the results of this section. Only constant persuasion rules
satisfy the Procedural Invariance and Free Disposal axioms when parties use
“positive arguments”. In contrast, when parties use “negative arguments”,
the axioms allow for non-trivial persuasion rules. The main accomplishment
of Propositions 1 and 2 is that they capture familiar rhetorical eﬀects and
trace them to particular argumentation rules.
Proposition 1 relies on a “rhetorical trick” similar to “promising the same
dollar to diﬀerent people”. Parties can raise arguments in the parallel ses-
sions, which would be unavailable to them in the plenary session because
they do not support their entire worldview. This eﬀect is traced to the ar-
gumentation rule Dpos (“positive argumentation”).
The biased persuasion rules characterized by Proposition 2 have a natural
interpretation. One party can win a debate only if a certain set of arguments
exclusively supports his position in the debate. In the plenary session, this
allows his opponent to win even when the latter’s own worldview lacks any
desirable attribute. This eﬀect is traced to the argumentation rule Dneg
(“negative argumentation”).
Proposition 2 is suggestive of asymmetric burden-of-proof assignments in
real-life debates between reformers and status-quo upholders. The status-quo
upholder can argue convincingly against a proposed reform by showing that
18some of the proposal’s desirable attributes could be achieved by a milder re-
form, even when the status quo itself does not satisfy any desirable attribute.
In contrast, the reformer can beat the status quo only if he shows that there
is no milder way than his own proposal to meet certain desiderata. We saw
that this eﬀect can be interpreted in terms of Proposition 2.
It should be emphasized that I do not view the axiomatic model as a
predictive theory. At this stage of the research agenda, it would be excessively
bold to try ﬁtting the results of this paper to concrete, real-life debates.
In particular, the Procedural Invariance axiom is probably violated in real-
life debates. For example, political candidates spend considerable energy on
procedural strategizing before public debates. Nevertheless, I believe that our
analysis of the logical implications of Procedural Invariance is instrumental.
It highlights rhetorical considerations such as the trick of “promising the
same dollar to diﬀerent people”, and how the availability of such a trick
depends on whether one is using positive or negative argumentation.
4 Extension to Multiple Argument Types
So far, the MDM has allowed parties to use a single type of argument in
debates. In real-life debates, however, we normally apply a multitude of
argument types - positive and negative arguments, proofs, examples, analo-
gies, and so forth - to the same raw data. This section extends the original
multi-issue debate model, so as to accommodate multiple argument types.
An extended multi-issue debate model (D,r) introduces a single mod-
iﬁcation into the model of Section 2. A debate is now an array of pairs
of argument sets d =( dh)h∈H,w h e r eH is a set of argument types and
dh =( Ah
1,A h
2) for every h ∈ H.T h u s , Ah
k ⊆ M is the set of type-h ar-
guments in support of party k.A p a r tf r o m t h i sm o d i ﬁcation, the model is
left untouched. The argumentation rule D(ω)=( Dh(ω))h∈H continues to
assign a triple of debates (two “parallel sessions” and one “plenary session”)
to every state ω.
As to the axioms imposed on extended MDM’s, the PI axiom remains
intact and we only need to rewrite the FD axiom, the content of which
remains essentially the same:
Axiom 3 (Modiﬁed-FD) If r[(Ah
1,A h





−k]f o r a l l h ∈ H,t h e nr[(Bh
1,Bh
2)h∈H]=k.
19The remainder of this section demonstrates the extended model’s capacity
to deliver insights into the question of relative rhetorical impact of diﬀerent
argument types. In Section 3, we characterized the persuasion rule for two
alternative argumentation rules, “positive argumentation” and “negative ar-
gumentation”. Now, suppose that parties can use both positive and negative
arguments at the same time. I.e., D =( Dpos,D neg),w h e r eDpos and Dneg
a r ea sd e ﬁned in Section 3.
Proposition 3 Let D =( Dpos,D neg) and assume that the extended multi-





α◦β(ψ) implies r[dα◦β(ω)] = r[dα◦β(ψ)] for every ω,ψ ∈ Ω.
Proof. Let r[dα◦β(ω)] = 1, w.l.o.g. Construct the state ω0 as follows:
ω0
11 = ω11, ω0
22 = ω22, ω0
12 = ω0









α◦β(ω).T h u s , dα◦β(ω0)=dα◦β(ω),
such that r[dα◦β(ω0)] = 1. Again, by the deﬁnition of D, dα(ω0)=dβ(ω0),





α◦β(ψ) means that ω11 ∪ ω12 ∪ ω21 = ψ11 ∪ ψ12 ∪ ψ21 and
ω22∪ω12∪ω21 = ψ22∪ψ12∪ψ21. Therefore, by construction, dα(ω0)=dα(ψ)
and dβ(ω0)=dβ(ψ), such that r[dα(ψ)] = r[dβ(ψ)] = 1.B yP I ,r[dα◦β(ψ)] =
1.
The rhetorical convention implied by this result is that negative argu-
ments are more eﬀective than positive arguments. In plenary sessions, the
parties’ negative arguments determine who wins the debate and the positive
arguments are ignored. (In parallel sessions, positive and negative arguments
are equivalent, hence the question of relative strength is meaningless for par-
allel sessions.) Carrying out similar exercises for other argument types is a
challenge for future research.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper proposed to model debates as a two-stage procedure for selecting
a winning party on the basis of “raw data”. First, an argumentation rule
determines which arguments are admissible, given the raw data. Second,
a persuasion rule determines the winning party, given the set of admissible
arguments. Of course, there are many ways in which this general idea can
20be practiced; this paper merely applied it to the speciﬁc context of debates
over a pair of issues.
In the model constructed for this special case, “raw data” is an assign-
ment of desirable attributes to all possible worldviews. A debate is a pair of
argument sets, one for each of the two debating parties. Multi-issue debates
can be carried out in several ways: the issues can be discussed independently
(in “parallel sessions”) or conjointly (in a “plenary session”). Therefore, an
argumentation rule is a function that maps raw data into argument sets in
three debates: two parallel sessions (one per issue) and one plenary session.
A persuasion rule assigns a winner to every debate, independently of whether
the debate is a plenary session or a parallel session on any particular issue.
The multitude of procedures for discussing multi-issue disagreements nat-
urally raises the question of whether the outcomes of the three sessions are
somehow linked. A “Procedural Invariance” axiom postulates such a link.
Coupled with a “Free Disposal” axiom, this leads to strong characterizations
of the persuasion rule for various speciﬁcations of the argumentation rule. In
an extended model, which incorporates multiple argument types, the char-
acterizations are capable of ranking the diﬀerent argument types by their
rhetorical impact.
More examples of D
The framework proposed in this paper is capable of accommodating ad-





α(ω)=( ω11 ∩ ω12,ω21 ∩ ω22)
3. d∗
β(ω)=( ω11 ∩ ω21,ω 12 ∩ ω22)
This argumentation rule captures the following rhetorical convention: an
attribute serves as an argument supporting a party’s position in a “session” if
it is assigned to all the worldviews that are consistent with this position.I nt h e
“plenary session”, party k’s argument set is simply ωkk, the set of attributes
assigned to his worldview. In the “parallel session devoted to issue α”, party
21k’s argument set is the intersection of ωkk and ωkj. Similarly, in the “parallel
session devoted to issue β”, party k’s argument set is the intersection of ωkk
and ωjk.T h u s ,D∗ i st h es a m ea sDpos, except that unions are replaced by
intersections.
The argumentation rule D∗ leads to the same impossibility result as Dpos.
Proposition 4 If (D∗,r) satisﬁes PI and FD, then r must be constant - i.e.,
there exists k ∈ {1,2},s u c ht h a tr(A,B)=k for every A,B ⊆ M.
Proof. Let r(A,B)=1 , w.l.o.g. Consider the following state ω: ω22 = B
and ω11 = ω12 = ω21 = A. Then, d∗
α◦β(ω)=( A,B) and d∗
α(ω)=d∗
β(ω)=
(A,A∩B). It follows that r[d∗
α◦β(ω)] = 1,a n db yP I ,r[d∗
α(ω)] = r[d∗
β(ω)] = 1.
Therefore, r(A,A ∩ B)=1 . Now consider the state ψ: ψ11 = A and ψ22 =
ψ12 = ψ21 = B. Then, d∗
α◦β(ψ)=( A,B) and d∗
α(ψ)=d∗
β(ψ)=( A ∩ B,B).
Recall that r(A,B)=1 ,h e n c er[d∗
α◦β(ψ)] = 1.B yP I ,r[d∗
α(ψ)] = r[d∗
β(ψ)] =
1. Therefore, r(A ∩ B,A)=1 . W eh a v et h u ss h o w nt h a tr(A,A ∩ B)=
r(A ∩ B,A) for every A,B ⊆ M.I np a r t i c u l a r ,r(M,∅)=r(∅,M).B yF D ,
r(A,B) is constant for all A,B ⊆ M.
The proof essentially mimics the proof of Proposition 1. In both cases, the
impossibility result is a consequence of the gap between the sets of arguments
that support a party’s position in parallel sessions and the set of arguments
that support his entire worldview. The diﬀerence is that under Dpos,t h e
former set contains the latter, whereas under D∗, the latter set contains the
former.1
The Domain of D
In the MDM, the function D acts on the full domain Ω.T h i sm e a n st h a t
a priori, any attribute can be assigned to any worldview in some state. This
is a very strong assumption because some attributes are logically linked to
certain worldviews. E.g., one cannot assign the attribute “a woman’s right
over her body” to an anti-abortionist opinion. (In contrast, we can easily
1I would like to thank a referee for suggesting the argumentation rule D∗,a sw e l la st h e
observation that D∗ implies the same impossibility result as Dpos,u s i n gt h es a m ek i n do f
proof.
22imagine an attribute such as “practical experience in other countries” being
assigned to any opinion on any issue.)
We may attempt to overcome this interpretational diﬃculty by assuming
that α and β do not stand for a ﬁxed pair of issues, such that the same MDM
is applied to multiple pairs of issues α and β, where the exact issues vary
but the parties’ identity remains ﬁxed. This interpretation is quite artiﬁcial,
in that it requires the rhetorical conventions captured by the MDM to be
invariant to the set of issues {α,β} under dispute.
Whenever we examine domain restrictions in an axiomatic model, the
question is which elements in the full domain play a more important role in
the strong results obtained under the full-domain assumption. For example,
in classical choice theory, preference proﬁles that contain Condorcet cycles are
the “villain” in Arrow’s impossibility result. Similarly, in the present model,
states of the world such as the one given by Table 2 play a crucial role in
the results. Speciﬁcally, pairs of states ω and ψ,s u c ht h a tω11 = ψ11 = A,
ω22 = ψ22 = B, ω12 = ω21 = A and ψ12 = ψ21 = B, cause the strongest
tension between parallel and plenary sessions. I expect domain restrictions
which rule out such pairs to loosen the characterization results of this paper
signiﬁcantly. I leave the task of analyzing the model under restricted domains
for future research.
Related Literature
The basic view of debates adopted here shares some features with Glazer
and Rubinstein (2001), despite many diﬀerences in the formal outlook. Glazer-
Rubinstein adopt a game-theoretic, mechanism-design approach. In their
model, a debate is a mechanism for eliciting information from interested par-
ties. A state is a binary vector of odd-length. The planner’s objective is to
know whether there are more 1’s or more 0’s in the state. However, the two
agents who know the state have conﬂicting interests.
The planner’s goal is to construct a mechanism that minimizes the ex-
pected number of erroneous decisions that he makes in equilibrium. The cru-
cial assumption is that the complexity of the mechanism is bounded: there
is an upper bound on the total number of messages that can be transmitted
i nt h ec o u r s eo ft h eg a m e . I ft h e r ew e re no bound, the planner’s problem
would be trivial. A debate is thus a mechanism of bounded complexity. For-
mally, it is very close to the standard notion of a game form. It consists of
23a procedural rule and a persuasion rule. A procedural rule is a description
of the messages that players are allowed to choose at any decision node. A
persuasion rule is a function that selects a winner for every terminal node in
the game.
Glazer-Rubinstein show that any constrained-optimal mechanism must
be sequential. Furthermore, the persuasion rule must exhibit a property
that a priori looks like a rhetorical fallacy: there are two arguments, x and
y, such that x is a winning argument when raised as a counter-argument
against y,a n dy e ty wins when raised as a counter-argument against x.
The distinction between procedural rules and persuasion rules in Glazer
and Rubinstein (2001) resembles the distinction between argumentation rules
and persuasion rules in the present paper. Of course, due to the very diﬀerent
contexts of the models, there is no direct formal link between their respec-
tive components.(I avoid using Glazer and Rubinstein’s exact terminology
because the term “procedural rule” would be misleading in a non-game-
theoretic framework.)
Aragones et. al. (2001) address the following question: why is argumen-
tation by analogy so eﬀective rhetorically? They construct two alternative
models of analogies, prove their equivalence and show that the problem of
ﬁnding analogies is NP-complete. They explain the rhetorical eﬀectiveness
of analogies by this aspect.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a big literature on communi-
cation games, which are sometimes referred to as debates. However, none of
the papers with which I am familiar deals with questions of rhetoric and ar-
gumentation. A partial exception is Lipman and Seppi (1995). Although not
explicitly focusing on argumentation, they formalize various notions of “par-
tial provability” in communication games. They characterize the “amount
of provability” that is suﬃcient for robust inferences. Once again, the inter-
e s t e dr e a d e ri sr e f e r r e dt oL i p m a n( 2 0 0 2 ) ,w h i c hc o n t a i n sam o r ee x t e n s i v e
discussion of the above-mentioned papers.
The question of how multiplicity of issues aﬀects aggregation has also been
studied in the framework of conventional social choice theory. This problem
is particularly interesting when the issues are logically interconnected. See
List (2004), for example. In general, several political scientists have recently
attempted to forge a synthesis between social-choice-theoretic methods and
alternative views of the democratic process, which emphasize its discursive,
deliberative aspect. (See Dryzek and List (2002).) The present paper shares
this motivation, despite the diﬀerent formal approaches.
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